

Hayate Sotome  
(Japan)

**“Everything had language”:**

**Vazha-Pshavela’s “Snake Eater” from the Perspective of Animal Studies**

**1. Introduction: “Everything had language yvelasac Turme ena aqvs~**

Animal studies are a recent new trend of literary studies. They concern, for example, how animals are represented in literary works and how we can think about animality and brutality, which are opposed to human reasoning, and so on. From this point of view, we explore a new possibility of understanding the poem “Snake Eater” (1901), Georgian poet Vazha-Pshavela’s (1861-1915) late work, regarding how Mindia, the hero of the poem, hears Nature’s voice. This motif that Nature (or animal) speaks is a universal theme and is often regarded as a naive or irrational tale. However, there are important possibilities to question the boundary between humans and animals, plants and materials, in the environment. As Huggan says, “This dream [of a possible future], already foretold, of a space beyond existing spatiotemporal boundaries requires a new language that reanimates nature in accordance with ‘ecotopian’ ideals” (Huggan 2004:718). Now we must rethink the meaning of the motif that Nature’s voice can be heard.

First, we should review how previous critics have evaluated the poem, including how they understand and characterize the hero who hears Nature’s voice, and the ideas found within the poem.\*

It is obvious that there is an opposition between Mindia and his wife Mzia as well as the villager Chalkhia in the poem. The critics inquire which position is correct or which position Vazha wanted to justify: i.e., whether we humans should accept the inconveniences caused by caring for animals and plants or not, and whether Mindia is a tragic hero or a stupid hero who leads the Nation and humans to catastrophe.

Another point to discuss is the evaluation of Mindia’s ability. This ability is, as the title of the poem shows, acquired by eating snake meat which is the food of *Kaji* (“evil” in Georgian mythology) in *Kajeti* (Hell). This mythological motif gives critics various impressions.

First, we consider negative criticism. For some critics, Mindia’s thought not to kill animals and plants is unacceptable, and the insistence of Mzia and the villagers is the correct way humans should think. For example, Kutelia says, “Vazha-Pshavela intentionally shows us how correct, useful, and extremely developed thought may become degraded, what kind of harm and danger it causes for humanity in this way” (Kutelia 1947:151).

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\* I refer to Arabuli’s article about previous works.

Although the start of his thought is correct, it invites the danger to our everyday life we spend using Nature. Vartagava offers a harsher criticism: “Thank God, humanity consists of intellect and reasonable humans like Chalkhiar rather than individuals captivated by hallucination and ‘sorcery’ like Mindia. Otherwise, the life of humans would stop...” (Vartagava 1921:135). Here he also regards Mindia’s insistence as harm that might prevent human life from developing. We can see the same attitude in Benashvili’s criticism that “Vazha-Pshavela, through his poem ‘Snake Eater,’ confirmed that, on the basis of sympathy, the idea of realizing harmony with the indefinite realm of Nature and, on the basis of this, to establish a spiritual relation with unspiritual Nature are opposed to the supreme rule of life” (Benashvili 1961:147).

Notably, these critics associate Mindia’s ability with “hallucination” or “sorcery,” which should be criticized. Mindia’s wife Mzia and the villagers like Chalkhiara are seen as “reasonable humans,” whereas Mindia is considered captive to “hallucination” as well as unintellectual and unreasonable because his ability was acquired by eating snake meat.

Kiknadze, however, takes a more neutral form of criticism. He regards Mindia’s ability as “instincts” (so, all the same, his ability is based on magical power), but these “human instincts are sometimes nobler than an egoistically restricted reason, which stands on the way to profane human value (Kiknadze 1989:154). Thus, according to K’ik’nadze, what Vazha wanted to show is that “besides reason, it is also possible to perceive and understand the environment in some way through instinct” (Kiknadze 1989:154). Following K’ik’nadze, Chkhenk’eli insists that eating snake meat is a kind of initiation, which Propp has analyzed, and with this initiation Mindia goes beyond the human boundary and finds his ability as the instinct in his heart (Chkhenkeli 2009: 161-169).

We now observe a more positive criticism. First, Abashidze, a famous literary critic, thinks that Mindia’s tragedy is caused by the treachery of his “I-hood” and his trust. He regards Mindia as a superman, and says: “This poem is the depiction of denouncing and loathing meticulousness, practical thoughts and featureless utilitarianism” (Kiknadze 1962: 394). Later, Ramishvili approves of Abashidze’s this thought, insisting Mindia is an outstanding hero of the Georgian nation (Ramishvili 1961:129).

The above-mentioned views that regard Mindia such as a national hero, individual, or superman, are followed by the views of other critics like Barnovi and K’ashia and often used in positive approaches to the poem. The former writes, “he became aware of the Creator’s existence and perceived the divine wisdom in it. His darkened unity with the world turned bright, the flow of creatures’ life became obvious for him, and he learned the language of every being” (Barnovi 1964:156). In this way, the critic thinks Mindia shares the Good with God, according to which he gains his ability.

Kashia, deepening this idea, wrote a book about “Snake Eater,” in which he insists that the poem shows a prototype of Georgian culture as the essential and transcendent Good of God. Kashia uniquely thinks that Mindia is an existence who overcomes death with the “choice” of eating snake meat, which makes him an outstanding “individual”

beyond the other villagers as a mass. Thus, Mindia stands on the good side of a dualistic dichotomy, and the critic evaluates Mindia highly. Mindia's ability is necessary for him – a protagonist of the Good and the ethic – because “this universal Good-wisdom-ethic lays as a foundation for Mindia's existence. Mindia is a defender of the faith, the language and the ethic of animate-inanimate beings. He neither denies their character, nor correct it. He tries to protect it, therefore Mindia's appearance resembles appearances of a god of field-meadow, a god of cornfield, a protector of animate-inanimate beings, and God of the earth. (...) That's why the sky, the earth, the forest open their hearts for Mindia and “see him approach like a God” – this is Nature, whereas, concerning Nation, it also sees Mindia as God” (Kashia 2013:40). Accordingly, Mindia's acquisition of his ability is based on his essence of the Good, and for Mindia, who tries to protect the Good and the ethic, including harmony with Nature, as the Nation trusts him, the elements of Nature also “open their hearts” and Mindia becomes able to understand Nature's voice.

As we see above, the themes of Mindia's ability to hear Nature's voice and eating snake meat, which lead him to acquire his ability, have been disputable points through the history of the criticism of the poem. For critics who see them negatively, the snake is a symbol of evil and, therefore, Mindia's ability acquired from the snake is evil as well. It is a kind of “hallucination” or “sorcery,” and Mindia's advocacy of being harmonious with Nature is unacceptable as it is opposed to the intellect of human beings. However, is Vazha-Pshavela's intention in writing the poem indeed to lead readers to the conclusion that exploiting Nature is unavoidable for human's intellectual life?

On the other hand, critics who see Mindia's anti-utilitarian position in a positive way and approve of his advocacy regard him as a mediator with Nature or God. In their view, Mindia is an outstanding hero among other villagers like his wife Mzia and Chalkhia, and he represents the Good. However, we must consider that these critics, especially Bar-novi and K'ashia, read the poem perhaps too idealistically and metaphysically. Seeing Mindia as the mediator or protector of the Good (of God, the Nation, and Nature) is based on an idea that we can represent the Good and Logos in the existence of Mindia, or that Mindia represents Logos.

In this way, these critics associate Mindia's ability with concepts like intellect, the Good, and essence. However, such criticism, far from understanding what the theme of hearing Nature's voice shows, may be opposed to it indeed, and this is the question of this paper. According to K'ashia, Mindia's ability is the result of his action to represent the Good and Logos as the mediator of Nature or God; in other words, Nature “opens [its] heart” because Mindia is the essential Good and the protector of it. That is, the Good and Logos exist first, and then Nature's voice is heard. However, one may ask whether Mindia's ability is realized only through metaphysic understanding. Instead, can we read the poem from an animistic standpoint in which human beings have Mindia's ability a priori or Nature has the ability to speak? Considering this question gives us the contemporary meanings of the poem.

## 2. Snakes

In this chapter, we discuss the significance of the snake, because when Mindia eats snake meat in *Kajeti*, that is when he becomes able to hear Nature’s voice:

With stealth and loathing he took a slice,  
ate it, and then the heavens looked down  
with merciful eyes on Mindia.  
His spirit flooded back renewed,  
his bones were clothed in flesh made new.\*  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:9)

Some critics regard Mindia’s ability as something negative due to the motifs of the snake, and *Kaji*, and *Kajeti*. Of course, they belong to the evil side of the dualistic dichotomy. However, important meanings concerning the structure of the whole poem are hidden here in these motifs, as a scholar says: “what itself is very interesting and meaningful is the mythologic basis of a Kaji-Snaky origin of the knowledge” (Arabuli 2003:140).

Needless to say, images of snakes are formed in many cultural and religious spheres, and in Georgia as well. When critics analyze the poem, they associate it with many kinds of images of snakes.

On the one hand, Barnovi points out that the image of the snake in the poem is related to Asian culture. “In Asian ancient folk tales, the snake is a sign of wisdom and science used evilly”(Barnovi 1964:156). Similar images of snakes are found in Georgian folklore as well. According to Gachechiladze, the snake is related to water and earth and, therefore, is a symbol of fertility. “[The] snake is recognized as the animal of divinity of fertility. In Georgia there are plenty of folk tales, legends and fairy tales about snakes, in which human’s cognition of Nature’s secret is associated with the name snake” (Gachechiladze 1959: 22).

On the other hand, in the Christian context, Sharabidze points out a relation with Moses’ copper snake. She says, “mythologically here everything is at their position. He ate and “he also became a knower” like Kaji. How can this becoming a knower be explained in a Christian context, since, we think, after his sharing the divinity, unlike Kaji, “his heart was closed to evil alone?” The Bible describes the case of Eucharist with a snake. Those who looked at the copper snake made by Moses with faith became participants in the secret Eucharist.” (Sharabidze 2012:116). Through drawing a comparison of Moses’ episode of a snake in the Old Testament, Sharabidze thinks Mindia’s eating of a snake has a similarity with the Eucharist of divine power.

Gachechiladze, meanwhile, analyses the images of snakes in a wide context. Especially, in the Christian context, he indicates the image of snake is related to wisdom in the gospel of Matthew (Gachechiladze 1959:11).

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\* I use Rayfield’s English translation. In some places I change the expression according to the context.

Moreover, the snake appearing in the Garden of Eden tempts Eve to eat the forbidden fruit and leads humans to the original sin. Of course, all abovementioned images have relations to “Snake Eater” to some extent, and the Georgian folk legend “Khogais Mindi,” from which the poet uses motifs of eating snake and understanding the voices, is directly associated to it,\* but the image of a snake of Eden is the most interesting for our perspective.

The snake that tempts humans in the Garden of Eden is very suggestive for Derrida, and he often touches on it in his books *The Animal That Therefore I am* and *The Beast and The Sovereign*. When the philosopher discusses it, citing Valéry’s “Silhouette of a Serpent,” he says, “it interests me because the serpent from Genesis is speaking and it says “I,” naming thus, by designating itself, what will be for us one of the very forms of the question: ipseity, indeed *sui-referential* egoity, auto-affection and automation, autokinesis, the autonomy that one recognizes in every animal: the very genesis of *zootobiography*” (Derrida 2008:65). Here, he indicates that ipseity and egoity are born in human beings when the snake tempts human beings in Genesis. Ipseity and egoity (i.e., subjectivity) are, however, not regarded for animals, therefore, the subjugation of animals to human beings is approved, and this subjectivity had not existed before the fall. Related to vegetarianism, Derrida pointed out that “before the fall and the institution of nakedness, God clearly commanded Adam to feed himself as a gatherer and not as a hunter” (Derrida 2008:112). That is to say, the world before the fall is very close to Mindia’s next insistence:

He urges others: “Men, don’t do  
a sinful thing; don’t fell trees,  
make do with stubble or dry twigs.”  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:12)

It is shown that the snake in “Snake Eater” is related to Kaji, and the snake in Genesis is just the incarnation of evil, which tempts Eve. Gachechiladze regards this temptation as follows: “According to the Bible, the reason for the change of humans’ life is the woman Eve – she ‘mistook’ first. The initial point of cognition was doubt. Why shouldn’t humans eat ‘the tree of knowledge,’ the fruit of ‘good and evil?’ This question rises in front of her. A devil in the shape of a snake appeared before Eve and tempted her to verify this doubt in reality. From this time, the shape of life of her descendants, and her own as well, completely changed” (Gachechiladze 1959:10). K’ashia as well, regarding Mzia as the representation of “temptation,” insists: “The tree of knowledge of Good and Evil” appeared before Adam, who is in mythic life, and eating of the fruit of the tree would be presage of death. The snake, which was ‘craftier than any other wild animal that the Lord God had made,’ tempted the wife of Adam, Eve, who, for her part, tempted Adam. Everyone knows what next occurred. (...) Now let’s see ‘Snake Eater’: Mindia eats snake and becomes free. The omniscient and Goodness-performer is created, i.e., he revives his own mythic life in Heaven. And here, in Heaven where he returned, he is tempted again and loses

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\* About the relation between “Snake Eater” and the legend “Khogais Mindi”, see Gachechiladze’s article.

everything, ‘dies,’ or changes into a dead man. (...) He revived as the first immortal man with his own sacrifice, and eating and digesting his tempter ‘snake,’ and was degraded to a dead man” (K’ashia 2013:86-87). Chkhenk’eli makes a similar comment: “Eve cursed by God is the first image of all woman, since she tempted Adam with eating the prohibited fruit. Mindia, who ‘little by little,’ ‘slowly,’ ‘gradually moving toward his wife’s sense, ate (in this case similar to biblical prohibited fruit) ‘kada’ baked by the wife, and with this he himself was ruined, or lost the divine knowledge (Heaven)” (Chkhenkeli 2009:192). Siradze also points out: “For instance, we think, it would be not right if we didn’t think of the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil. This would be useful for us when determining the character of Mindia’s knowledge. (...) If the biblical fruit of the tree gave Mindia the wisdom, with which he was divided from Nature and opposed it firstly, his knowledge is completely different – distinguished and elevated from that of other people’s” (Siradze 2012:59). These four critics show how to read “Snake Eater” in parallel with Genesis, in which the snake is the incarnation of Evil and the symbol of temptation for human beings.

Thus, we can summarize the parallel relationship between “Snake Eater” and Genesis as follows. In Genesis, Eve is tempted to eat the fruit by a snake. She eats the fruit, thereby committing the original sin, and is driven out from the Garden of Eden. At this moment, ipseity and egoity are appearing in human beings, and the animal which does not have them is defined at the same time. On the other hand, in “Snake Eater,” Mindia eats a piece of snake in order to commit suicide. He then acquires the ability to understand Nature’s voice and escapes from captivity in *Kajeti*. The world to which he returns after escaping from *Kajeti* and hears the voice is “Heaven,” where the world was before the original sin, or, in Derrida’s other words, before the naming of the animals and the institution of nakedness, and the world where animals have not yet been subjugated to human beings.

So, it can be said that eating the fruit in Genesis and eating snake in the poem are the triggers to move beyond the two different worlds- before and after the fall.\* In Genesis, Adam and Eve go to the world of “History” after committing the original sin, whereas Mindia goes back to the pre-Historic world. In K’ashia’s words, when Mindia returns from *Kajeti*, he revives as “the first immortal man” in “Heaven,” or the Garden of Eden. This is realized when he, by eating snake (i.e., temptation, the original sin, and evil), becomes the existence which transcends them.

In addition, we can say that there is a similarity between the poem and Genesis regarding the words used in them. Below is the Georgian strophes and its English translation related to Genesis.

gulis xedva da Tvalebis,  
rogorc brmas da yruvs, **gaexsna**.

Sight was **opened** his heart and eyes,  
as though hitherto he were blind and deaf.

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:9)

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\* Here we should remind of Chkhenk’eli’s recognition of eating as initiation.

qajni brazoven, ra hxedven-  
**gamecnierda** glexia.

The wizards raged when they discovered  
a simple peasant had become **aknower**.

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:10)

A passage from Genesis is as follows:

რამეთუ უწყოდა ღმერთმან, ვითარმედ: რომელსა დღესა სჭამოთ მისგანი, განგებუნენ თქუენ თუალნი და იყვნეთ, ვითარცა ღმერთნი, **მეცნიერ** კეთილსა და ბოროტისა.

For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be **opened**, and you will be like God, **knowing** good and evil. (Gen. 3:5)

As we see, by eating snake in “Snake Eater” and by eating the fruit in Genesis, the “eye is opened” and humans come to “know” Good and Evil (the same stem is used, „gamecnierda” (*gametsnierda*) in the poem and „mecnier” (*metsnier*) in Genesis in Georgian). In Genesis, Adam and Eve eat the fruit, which leads their eyes to be “opened.” They then know their nakedness, and a decisive division is introduced between human beings who know Good and Evil and animals. In the poem “Snake Eater,” like going back to History, eating snake meat means overcoming temptation and the original sin, and Mindia goes back to the period before the fall or the institution of nakedness.

### 3. *Kaji* and *Kajeti*

In contrast to the image of the snake discussed above, *Kajeti*, where *Kaji* lives and Mindia has been captured for 12 years, comes from Georgian mythology. *Kajeti* is “the Hell is under the ground, the land of Evils, which we can equate with ‘Kajaveti’” (Sharabidze 2012:94). Bakradze points out that *Kaji* was a god in the pagan period because *Kaji* is anthropomorphized. Answering the question of why *Kaji* is anthropomorphized and a kind of god, he insists, “maybe because it was also a god first and then changed into an evil spirit. This must have happened under the influence of the Christian religion” (Bakradze 1968:162-163). He supposes that *Kaji* and *Kajeti* existed from the pagan period, and during the spreading of Christianity, they changed to evil in opposition to Christianity. It is important that, whereas snake can be interpreted in a Christian context in the work, *Kaji* and *Kajeti* come from the pre-Christian, pagan motifs.

Then, what do these motifs mean? That is, what does the difference between *Kaji*/*Kajeti* used from myth or (animistic) paganism and the snake from the Bible mean in our perspective?

It is natural within animism to consider that Nature speaks, of course. Here Manes’ discussion about Nature’s silence is very interesting for us; according to him, today Na-

ture’s silence is caused by the introduction of literacy in European culture and exegesis of the Bible in the process of the development of Christianity during the Middle Ages. Literacy prepares epistemology to abstract the world in humans’ words or texts, and the interpretation requests the exegesis to understand Nature through Biblical symbols. “In the medieval period, animism as a coherent system broke down in our culture, for a variety of reasons“due to these “two powerful institutional technologies” (Manes 1992: 343).Manes further, states that, in animistic culture,which had existed in every tribal community, the opposition between Nature and culture had not beenplaced; therefore, “animistic societies have almost without exception avoided the kind of environmental destruction that makes environmental ethics an explicit social theme with us” (Manes 1992: 343). We must withhold to apply his statement to Georgian or Orthodox culture simply, but at least we can say that there was a similar situation in Georgia where, with pre-Christian animistic epistemology, Nature was regarded as a speaking subject, and the unlimited destruction of the environment as takes place today was restrained. Mindia’s suggestion to other villagers not to cut trees and hunt animals shows this directly.

In light of Manes’abovementioned issue, Gachechiladze’s insistence is more meaningful: “If the legend about KhogaisMindi develops in Georgia’s paganistic period, now Vazha in the poem develops Mindia’s adventure on the condition of the feudalistic-Christian social relationship, or in the epoch of Queen Tamar, as written in the poem. Mindia’sdoctrine about humans’ attitude toward Nature is born and decided on the basis of paganism in ‘Khogais Mindi.’ Nature’s treachery is here understood as treachery of the paganistic worldview. In ‘Khogais Mindi’ there is no conflict against society, whereas in ‘Snake Eater’ main is this conflict, which is brought in the condition of feudalistic society” (Gachechiladze 1959: 59-60). He says Vazha-Pshavela brings the animistic relationship between Nature and human beings into the feudalistic and Christian communityof the Middle Ages, and here the opposition between Mindia and the villagers is equal not only to the opposition between the individual and community, which is depicted in Vazha’s other poems (e.g., “AludaKetelauri” and “Guest and Host”), but also to the opposition between paganism/animism and feudalism/Christianity. The reason for the tragedy of Mindia, from this point of view, comes from the situation of the Middle Ages characterized with the literacy and the exegesis of Bible, in which paganism-animismwas not the ethic of community anymore.

Furthermore, Danelia criticizes “Snake Eater” much more negatively in this way. He considers the poem “weak” because of a logical contradiction; the whole poem is written with the animistic worldview, whereas the episode of self-sacrifice of wheat (for details, see chapter 4) is based on Christianity. If based on pagan-animism, wheat never sacrificesitself to human being, so that “the ear of wheat can rejoice to satisfy human beings only from the Christian point of view because the task of the ear of wheat is to serve humans from this viewpoint. However, the poem doesn’t stand on the Christian standpoint” (Danelia 1927:45-46). He also sees paganism and Christianity in the scheme of opposition that Manes shows; therefore, their coexistence is impossible and “illogical.” However, as

shown by later studies, paganism and Christianity are united in Vazha-Pshavela's whole work (Sharabidze 2012:13; Chkhenkeli 2009:182). Ironically, the "illogic" that Danelia points out as the weak point of the poem is, on the contrary, an important element of the poet's worldview.

The answer to the question we proposed about *Kaji/Kajeti*s as follows: They each mean evil/Hell and supply the important motif of this work that Nature's voice is heard, based on animism in the legend. If the snake is the symbol of Christian temptation and evil, *Kaji/Kajeti* are the symbol of mythic, paganistic and animistic evil and, as Gachechiladze says, are characterized as evil during Georgia's Christianization. If we follow Manes' insistence on the opposition of animism and Christianity, in "Snake Eater", Mindia shows the relationship between Nature and human beings that is lost in feudalistic and Christian world of Georgia's Middle Ages. However, here, what is more important is the kind of unification of mythology/paganism/animism and Christianity through the image of evil, rather than an emphasis on their opposition.

#### 4. Nature's voice

The excerpt below describes the very moment Mindia eats snake meat and hears Nature's voice:

From that day on he understood  
what birds sang, plants and animals spoke  
when they were glad or suffering.  
Everything that the Lord had made  
had language: all was within the law.  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:9)

About this issue that Mindia "understood" Nature's voice, we shall propose another kind of epistemological approach; here, we should emphasize the viewpoint that Nature speaks subjectively, so that we must recognize the subjectivity of Nature, rather than that Mindia understands Nature's voice. Of course, these two viewpoints mean the same, but if we think of it only from the latter point of view, we risk deviating from the animistic idea of the poem, considering that the matter is Mindia's special ability, like Abashidze's "I-hood" and "superman" and, K'ashia's "individual." As we discussed above, when some critics evaluate the poem positively, Mindia is often characterized in this way, and Nature "opens its heart" because Mindia represents the Good. However, here we must pay attention because, as far as we read the poem from their point of view, Mindia's (super)humanistic subjectivity is the presupposition of "understanding" the voice. On this presupposition, the voice is understood by humans only after (superman) Mindia who can understand it exists. Yet, our epistemological standpoint should be based on the animistic worldview that Nature itself is the subject to speak.

At this point, we again refer to Derrida’s animal studies. Using his own neologism “animot,”\* he criticizes the concept of animal in the history of European philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, Heidegger, and Levinas. According to Derrida, these philosophers ignored differences between animals and conceptualized them as “the animal” in the singular. They believed that since the animal has no reason, it can “react” but cannot “respond”; thus, the animal has no “responsibility” and, at the same time, language, i.e., Logos, is what justifies humans’ rule of the animal. In other words, the logocentrism that Derrida points out in European philosophy appears in the scheme “human which has logos/ the animal which doesn’t have it,” and the former always refer to the latter and subjugates it. The title of the essay “The animal That Therefore I Am,” which is a parody of the Cartesian “*Cogito ergo sum*,” means that there is animal first and then human being follows after it, rather than that we should restrict epistemological subjectivity only to humans.

When we think of “Snake Eater” from Derrida’s this perspective, we find a little problem in the position of seeing the heroic character Mindia as having the traits of “I-hood,” “superman,” and “individual.” As we see, this characterization is based on regarding him as a man who represents the Good and has Logos, and, on the other hand, guarantees the coincident recognition that animals (and plants) does not have any language and Logos. In this view, Nature, which does not have language, can express itself only through Mindia, who speaks for it, and therefore Nature itself never speaks indeed. In this way, in discussions that emphasize Mindia’s heroic character, as far as his ability belongs to him, Nature’s voice is never heard. Thus, we throw questions to the critics who have written positively: Would Abashidze think that animals can have “I-hood,” which Mindia betrays? Would K’ik’nadze think animal “instinct” is inferior to omniscience or Logos since he defines Mindia’s ability not as omniscience but “instinct”? Would K’ashia recognize outstanding Mindia’s “individuality” in animals as well?

The scholars criticizing negatively are faithful to the tradition of European philosophy in this point. The fact that they see Mindia’s ability as “hallucination” and “sorcery” is nothing but the proof showing that they follow the Biblical-Promethean dichotomic scheme of “human/animal.” It is impossible and unacceptable to violate the boundary between two. Animals must exist as “the animal” that does not have language, and since it is impossible for their voices to be heard, Mindia’s ability must be a “hallucination.” Not only the critics but also the villagers say,

No-one listens: his advice  
seems to them a madman’s speech.

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\* This word consists of animal and *mot* (meaning “word” in French) and targets these three effects: 1. “To have the plural *animals* heard in the singular”; 2. “The suffix *mot* in *l’animot* should bring us back to the word,” i.e., to emphasize that the word “animal” is just the word. 3. “It would not be a matter of ‘giving speech back’ to animals but perhaps of acceding to a thinking (...) that thinks the absence of the name and of the world otherwise, and as something other than a privation” (Derrida 2008:47-48). Obviously, this study does not follow Derrida’s theory, especially in the meaning of the third effect. It can be said that “Snake Eater,” in this meaning, gives speech back to animals (and Nature).

“God made trees to meet our needs.”  
And to this day, who thinks twice  
to spare the aspen or the beech.  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:12)

We can say that what the villagers say here is based on the Biblical worldview, where animals or Nature are served for human to use. Such dichotomic recognition stands in opposition to the animistic worldview that Mindia proposes to the villagers. Captured in the dichotomy, the villagers, who call Mindia’s advice “hallucination,” cannot hear Nature’s voice.

If trees and rocks have language too,  
why dont they speak to us as well?  
Mindia, I say, has concocted a lie  
to lead us astray. We’re men as good  
as he. We’ve ears to hear.  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:14)

Vazha-Pshavela creates these motifs and themes derived from Georgian mythology and folklore, which are very different from traditional animal politics of European philosophy and in which the pre-Christian paganistic-animistic motif is preserved.

### **5. Self-sacrifice of the flowers and wheats**

One of the most dramatic moments of the poem is the scene of the self-sacrifice of the flowers and wheat. First, we will consider the self-sacrifice of the flowers. In spring, when Mindia walks in the mountains and fields, the flowers, after greeting, say to him:

“I am the cure for this disease.”  
The next calls, “I am that ill’s cure.”  
Mindia plucks them, takes them off  
before the morning dew has gone.  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:11)

Then, the reason the flowers propose their own use as medicine for humans is described as follows:

It turns out that the flowers have their character:  
It is as though the flowers think  
nothing of their seething life,  
so long as they may heal disease.  
They yearn to be of use to man,  
to flesh and bone beset by ills.

Thus act the flowers, but the trees  
weep and Mindia alone  
understands their moans and cries.  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:11)

Here, we must pay attention to the possibility that the flowers may have another thought based on the animistic worldview, namely, that they propose using “their seething life” for humans only when responding to humans’ demand, and without this demand, they would just enjoy their “seething life.” Indeed, as we see in the excerpt above, the trees cry because they are cut by humans.

This argument is described more clearly in the episode of the self-sacrifice of wheat. When being reaped, a part of them hopes to be reaped voluntarily:

“I’m the one to cut down, Mindia,  
I beg you, do not pass me by.”  
“No, me,” another calls out, “for  
I am more frightened by the sky.  
When I see a patch of mist  
my body crumples, limp with fear.  
Woe should the hail slash at my throat.”  
(...)  
Hailstones make the corn afraid,  
as men fear being left to starve,  
and yet the sickle cuts a swathe  
far more deadly than the hail!  
The ripe and golden ears of grain  
save themselves for men to use,  
they do not wish to rot and waste  
for crows and kites to peck at them.  
That is why they urge us on,  
in one loud roar, to reap them down.  
They yearn to be our food and bread,  
to sate the hungry so that we  
can pray for rest for the deceased  
and call upon the heavenly powers.”  
(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:13-14)

In this way, the wheat, as same as the flowers, serve themselves for humans to satisfy their hunger. They are afraid of being damage by hail and not becoming “food and bread.” It is obvious that this is based on the famous episode in the Gospel of John, and, as we mentioned, Danelia regards this as a Christian motif. Also, the wheat’s hope not to be eaten by crows and kites though they are happy to serve humans is based on the antho-

po-centric recognition that gives humans priority in the use of animals. In this sense, these episodes of the flowers and wheat represent the Biblical worldview.

However, in the poem, the voice of other wheat shows that not every wheat hopes to sacrifice itself for humans.

Still louder, yet another flower  
cries out: "Do not abandon me,  
I pray God give you strength and joy."  
They drive me mad with furious sounds,  
I am bewildered with compassion.

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:13)

Here, wheat raises a voice that is resistant to being reaped. Because of this, Mindia "is bewildered." Not all wheat proposes unconditional self-sacrifice to humans, and some wheat does not wish for self-sacrifice at all.

Now we can discuss this scene of self-sacrifice from the view of Derrida's animal studies again. When he criticizes a series of recognitions about animals in European philosophy in his books, he touches on Lacan's ideas. Derrida points out that, although Lacan recognizes animality in humans (especially in the imaginary), he remains still in the traditional thoughts of European philosophy, which divides humans from animals. About Lacan's thoughts on animals Derrida writes, "The figure of the animal suddenly surfaces in this difference between pretense [*feinte*] and deception [*tromperie*]. There is, according to Lacan, a clear distinction between what the animal is quite capable of, namely, strategic pretense (warrior, predatory, or seductive suit, pursuit, or persecution) and what it is incapable of and incapable of witnessing to, namely, the deception of speech [*la tromperie de la parole*] within the order of the signifier and of Truth. The deception of speech of course means, as we shall see, lying (...); but more precisely deception involves lying as what, in promising what is true, includes the supplementary possibility of telling the truth in order to lead the other astray, in order to have him believe something other than what is true" (Derrida 2008:127-128). The animal is decisively different from the human at the very point that the animal is capable of deceiving for warrior or predatory reasons and so on but incapable of telling a lie based on truth. In other words, animals can make communication, but cannot make further communication based on communication, i.e., meta-communication. Therefore, the animal, as "the subject of the signifier" (Lacan), cannot have communication based on the difference between Truth and Speech.\*

However, Nature in the poem already has subjectivity in the animistic worldview. The flowers and wheat accept self-sacrifice, i.e., the decision of their own death, as their own responsibility. In other words, to the request of death for humans, they respond by serving their bodies voluntarily instead of crying and resisting, so that their death accomplishes their responsibility.

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\* Derrida criticizes this thought, insisting that the line between pretense and deception is obscure.

As we saw, there are two different speeches by Nature in the episodes of self-sacrifice of the wheats. First is the Biblical thought of using Nature admitted by God, and from this thought Nature serves humans with joy and humans receives it unconditionally. This is understandable for the villagers and the critics who have negative opinions, and they behave or criticize accordingly. Second is the animistic view that Nature cries against the unilateral request of humans, which is based on the Christian worldview. This is, on the contrary, not understandable for the villagers (because they do not understand Nature’s voice), and for the critics as well, who regard it as “hallucination” that makes rational human life impossible. It is understood only for Mindia (and readers through him).

What is proposed in this paper is not the idea that the two speeches contradict each other as Danelia says, nor are there categorical differences between trees, grass, and animals, and the flowers and wheat as Chkhenk’eli points out; rather, it is the idea that they come into being simultaneously, and this is a bet of the poem by Vazha. To be more precise, Nature becomes a subject that is capable of responding freely on its own responsibility when the poet introduces the animistic world view that Nature has subjectivity into the Christian world (of the Middle Ages), and this decisively changes Nature into “the subject of the signifier.” That is to say, here the wheat cries and protests against the request based on the Biblical worldview by humans, but, from the animistic point of view, the wheat does not need to respond to the request; rather, it is natural for the wheat to refuse it for self-preservation (that is why Danelia says this is a contradiction). However, in the poem, the fact that they respond to it willingly as they cry means an indeterminate suspension of the deference between Truth and Speech: If we presuppose a Biblical worldview, in which the villagers (and readers of this poem) believe, the Truth will be questioned within the Speeches because the wheat confesses that it cries while obeying (however, as we saw, finally the wheat’s self-sacrifice leads to their responsibility). On the contrary, if their cries show animistic worldview is true, all the same Nature says they serve themselves with joy following the logic of humans and does not deny the Biblical worldview. In other words, if the cries of the plants is regarded as a “reaction” of the self-preservation against a request from humans, the act of self-sacrifice would not be accomplished. However, the fact that the wheat in the poem offer self-sacrifice means that they do not “react” but “respond,” and as a result, their cries and self-sacrifice coexist. Thus, it is suspended for humans to decide which of the speeches is true, and finally, is impossible to decide. We might also say the following: Whichever is true, the wheats tell lies, and there remains the difference between Truth and Speech (in Derrida’s words, here is the “supplementary possibility”). So, it is no longer important to discuss which side the Truth is on but to recognize that, when we put these two variations of Truth into parenthesis, there is a deception between Truth and Speech, and deception is possible for the wheat and Nature; therefore, they are the “subjects of the signifier.” Accordingly, we can say that the episodes of self-sacrifice are the core of the poem.

In this way, in the scene of the self-sacrifice in “Snake Eater,” the Christian and animistic worldview are not opposed to each other but coexist. This is what makes Nature’s subjectivity, which is given the animistic epistemology, definitive.

## 6. Conclusion: “I cannot understand aRar mesmis”

When Mindia starts to cut and hunt according to his wife Mzia, Nature’s voice becomes no longer haerd. Mindia tries to get it back by sacrificing cattle:

Two men alone in the open air  
stand at the shrine. One clasps  
a bloodstained dagger in a bloody hand;  
before him lies a slaughtered calf,  
collapsed and sprawling on its side.

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964: 25)

However, this attempt is in vein. This is because animal sacrifice is based on carnophallogocentrism; by giving humans the power of subjectivity through the ritual act of killing an animal, humans subjugate animals. The sacrifice of animals fundamentally supports anthropocentrism and opposes the philosophy of the poem that recognizes Nature has subjectivity. Mindia, who now doesnot understand Nature’s voice, is just in the anthropocentrism Mzia and the villagers represent.\*In other words, he repeats the History of human beings in that, by Mzia’s temptation to cut and hunt, he falls from Heaven or the Garden of Eden. That is why Mindia sacrifice ten cattle to God, like humans do in the Old Testament. Here also, we see a parallel relationship with Genesis. Mindia goes back to the Garden of Eden by overcoming the original sin, is tempted, and again goes down into the world after the fall, where he “cannot understand” Nature’s voice.

This relationship is repeated in the scene of the conversation between Mzia and the village women, Sandua. When Mzia confesses that Mindia is bothered by losing his ability, she recounts that he says to her as follows

‘I am caught up in sin thanks to you,  
I’ve done what I should not have done,  
I’ve slaughtered game and cut up wood,  
as though these things were ordinary, right.  
The flowers no longer speak to me,  
nor the stars in the sky at night.

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:31)

The women reply as follows to rebuke her:

“If indeed what you’ve said is true,  
you are the reason he fell into sin;  
let your tongue be cut out and you be hanged

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\* Chkhenk’eli notices the strangeness of this scene and says: “In the poem the use of flowers “for benefit of human” and the kill of cattle by Mindia who has lost the wisdom due to kill of games and repents of this sound like a strange contrast with Vazha’s clear lines in “Snake Eater”. (Chkhenk’eli2009:183)

from a hook high up, underneath  
let a fire be lit to lick you with flames.  
You have sinned against our land  
and brought us also into sin.

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:31-32)

They say that Mindia “falls into sin” because he cuts and hunts to fulfill Mzia’s request, and, as a result, the flowers and stars no longer give him their voice. Furthermore, Sandua says that Mzia herself has already “has sinned against our land.” We must pay attention to the fact that the word “sin” (codva) is used repeatedly. What is indicated by the word is not only the sin of cutting and hunting in the poem.

This becomes clearer when we consider the following excerpt from another variation of the poem:

Woman, cursed by God,  
you, antagonized against me  
by Evil rather than God,  
illed with reason,

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:343)

Here, Mindia clearly declares Mzia is “cursed by God.” Likewise, Chkhenk’eli writes, as we see above, that “Eve cursed by God is the first image of all woman, since she tempted Adam with eating the prohibited fruit.” The sin mentioned here means cutting and hunting directly. It is what Mzia has already committed and, accordingly, has been cursed for, and what Mindia has just committed during the plot of the poem, while, of course, it is a metaphor for the original sin in Genesis.

As a punishment of the sin written repeatedly here, it is a flood that Mzia’s nightmare previsions:

The sky turned black as blackest pitch,  
the dark air swirled, a squall began,  
pitch rained down onto the earth,  
hot droplets poured down and the streams  
ran so horribly and violently,  
people shouted from thousands of places,  
‘help us, we are perishing’.  
And indeed I watch the water  
carry down people, a shield, a sword,  
the fort disintegrates all over,  
the houses, great stone walls all fall;

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:33)

The flood washes away everything including Mzia and other villagers. Even though she prays God for helping her child, she does not manage to give any voice. At this time, the faces of men appear before her, and they say,

“Where are you going? Off, with the water!  
that is God’s command to you!”

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:34)

Certainly, this flood is the command of God, and it is obvious that the flood in Mzia’s nightmare has a parallel relationship between the flood caused by God in Genesis.

In the final chapter, Mindia is defeated by the enemy. He despairs that he sees fire in his village and chooses to commit suicide.

Saying no more, he took off his hat,  
put his thumb on the hilt of his sword,  
drew it and pressed the point to his heart.  
Blood, like a spurting spring, splashed out,  
gushing from the wound in his chest.  
The moon shed its light upon the ridge,  
where alone the wild goat live,  
and fixed in its beams the suicide  
with the hue of a mourning girl.  
And the soft breeze wafted to and fro,  
carefree, singing a peaceful song.  
It brushed its wings on the sword’s sharp point,  
which jutted out a bright red tongue  
stained by the juice of the human chest.  
It began to frolic over the green,  
whistling cheerfully, proud and free.

(Vazha-Pshavela 1964:40)

In this way “Snake Eater” ends. The question is that, contrary to the case in other poems like “Aluda Ketelauri,” in which Nature has sympathy for the heroes, in “Snake Eater,” Nature has no interest in Mindia’s death and keeps silent despite the fact that it had spoken to Mindia. Arabuli thinks that the poem shows an apocalyptic end of the world as the result of humanistic sins and faults, and says, “In this situation Nature isn’t able to be a sympathizer nor a nonsympathizer. As a result of this Nature must only be cold, moveless and cold-blooded.” (Arabuli 2003:152)

However, if we follow Arabuli’s thought, why should we think Nature turns “cold” although it has talked to Mindia warmly before? Here, we must think that the reason is not on the side of Nature but humans; when Mindia loses his ability, in fact, Nature’s voice becomes silent for us, who understand it through Mindia as a mediator between Nature and humans. However, from the point of view of the animistic epistemology that we emphasize in this study, the moon and the breeze must have some kind of voice; they do more than “waft to and fro.” “We just no longer have any way to hear their voice. It will contradict what the poet depicts in “Snake Eater” to think of Nature’s silence as the indifference to Mindia’s

death or the denial of Mindia’s insistence by the poet. What the poet tries to describe though Nature’s silence is the distance that shows how far we, living in History after the fall, are from the world before the fall, which Mindia experiences.

We now conclude shortly: The philosophy that Nature speaks in “Snake Eater” is based on an epistemology different from the anthropocentric-logocentric epistemology of European philosophy; the epistemology, the basis of which is the animistic view of Nature, which we can see in Georgian mythology and folklore, is also indicated in the worldview of the Garden of Eden in Genesis where, before the fall, humans and Nature live in harmony. From this point, we can say that Mindia’s story is an adventure of going back to the fall (and falling again). Vazha-Pshavela sets the scene in the Middle Ages on the basis of the legend “Khogais Mindi” and tries to show in the poem that the plants and Nature not only cry and protest as a “reaction” to preserve themselves against the request from humans, but also sacrifice themselves as a “response” on their own responsibility, as established by the coexistence of the mythic-animistic and Christian worldviews.

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ჰაიატე სოტომე  
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ვაჟა-ფშაველას პოემა „გველის მჭამელი“ Animal Studies-ის  
პერსპექტივიდან  
რეზიუმე**

**საკვანძო სიტყვები:** Animal Studies, ვაჟა-ფშაველა, „გველის მჭამელი“.

Animal Studies არის ჰუმანიტალური მეცნიერების ერთ-ერთი უახლესი მიმართულება, რომელიც შეისწავლის, თუ როგორ აისახება ცხოველი ლიტერატურულ ნაწარმოებებში, როგორ შეიძლება განვიხილოთ „ცხოველურობა“ და „მხეცობა“, რაც ადამიანურ „გონებას“ უპირისპირდება. ამ პერსპექტივიდან რომ განვიხილოთ, ძალზე საინტერესო იქნება პოემა „გველის მჭამელი“, რომლის მთავარ გმირს, მინდიას ესმის ბუნების ხმა.

წინამორბედი კრიტიკოსების ერთი ნაწილისთვის მიუღებელია მინდიას მოძღვრება. ისინი მიიჩნევენ, რომ ის ჰალუცინაციითაა შეპყრობილი; მეორე ნაწილისთვის კი მისი ქადაგება მისაღებია იმიტომ, რომ მინდია „მეობას“, „ზეკაცსა“ და „პიროვნებას“ წარმოადგენს. ეს კრიტიკოსები მაშინაც, როცა მინდიას ქადაგებასა და თვითონ პოემას პოზიტიურად აფასებენ, ბუნების ენის გაგების უნარს გონებას, ლოგოსს, სიკეთესა და არსებობას უკავშირებენ. თუმცა საქმე ისაა, რომ ასეთმა „ლოგოცენტრულმა“ კრიტიკამ საწინააღმდეგო გაგებაც შეიძლება გამოიწვიოს, რადგან მათი აზრით, მინდია სიკეთის მატარებელია და ბუნება ამიტომ აძლევს ზებუნებრივ ნიჭს. მაგრამ, განა ამის უნარი მხოლოდ მეტაფიზიკურად რეალიზდება?

განვიხილავთ გველისა და ქაჯების მოტივებს. გველი, რომლის ჭამის შემდეგ მინდია ზებუნებრივ უნარს იძენს, ამა თუ იმ სიმბოლოდ შეიძლება მივიჩნიოთ, მაგრამ ამჯერად ჩვენთვის საინტერესოა „დაბადებაში“ დახატული გველი, რომელიც ევას აცდუნებს. ფრანგი ფილოსოფოსი ჟ. დერიდა წერს, რომ „დაბადებაში“ გველის აცდუნებისა და ნაყოფის ჭამის შედეგად ადამიანს მეობა და ეგო გაუჩნდა, რომლებსაც ცხოველი არ ფლობს, რითაც ადამიანი ცხოველს ემიჯნება და რის გამოც ადამიანს ცხოველი ექვემდებარება. შესაბამისად, შეიძლება ვთქვათ, რომ ბიბლიაში – ნაყოფის ჭამა და პოემაში – გველის ჭამა ცოდვისწინა და ცოდვისშემდგომ სამყაროში გადასვლა-გადმოსვლას ნიშნავს. ამ შემთხვევაში, გველის ჭამა ცდუნების, თავდაპირველი ცოდვისა და ბოროტების დაძლევის ნიშნავს.

რაც შეეხება ქაჯსა და ქაჯეთს, ეს მოტივები კი, გველისგან განსხვავებით, ქრისტიანობამდელი წარმართობისა და ანიმისტობიდანაა (კონკრეტულად, გადმოცემა „ხოვას მინდიდან“). პოეტი ამ მოტივების შუასაუკუნეების ქრისტიანულ სამყაროში გადატანით წარმართულსა და ანიმისტურ მსოფლ-მხედველობას ქმნის პოემაში.

ზემოთქმულ საკითხებთან დაკავშირებით, ხაზი უნდა გავუსვავთ იმ ეპისტემოლოგიურ შეხედულებას, რომ ბუნების ენა მინდიას კი არ ესმის, არამედ თვით ბუნება ეხმიანება მას. ეს იმიტომაცაა, რომ პირველი შეხედულების მიხედვით, მინდიას მხოლოდ არსებობის შედეგად ესმის ხმა.

დერიდას აზრით, ევროპული ფილოსოფოსები ცხოველებს შორის განსხვავებას უგლველყოფენ და მხოლოდითი „ცხოველად“ განსაზღვრავენ. „ცხოველს“ გონება არ აქვს და ამიტომ ადამიანის მიერ დასმულ კითხვაზე რეაგირება (რეაქცია) კი შეუძლია, მაგრამ არ შეუძლია უპასუხოს. აქედან გამომდინარე, არ აქვს „პასუხისმგებლობა (responsibility)“, ენა და ლოგოსი. შესაბამისად, ეჭვს შევიტანთ იმ კრიტიკოსების მოსაზრებებში, რომლებიც მინდიას „მეობას“, „ზეკაცას“, და „პიროვნებას“ ხედავენ, რადგანაც თუ მინდიას უნარის შექმნა მისი გმირობითაა განპირობებული, მაშინ ლოგოსის მქონე მინდიას უპირისპირდება ლოგოსის არმქონე ბუნება. ბუნება, ამ შემთხვევაში, მხოლოდ მინდიას მეშვეობით ლაპარაკობს და თვითონ აღარ ეხმიანება.

პოემაში იკვეთება ეპიზოდი ყვავილებისა და პურის თავთავების ადამიანისთვის თვითშენიშვნისა. ყურადღება გავამახვილოთ იმ სტრიქონებზე, რომლებიც თვითშენიშვნასთან ერთდროულადაა ნათქვამი – საპროტესტო ხმა. დერიდას თვალსაზრისიდან რომ განვიხილოთ, ეს სცენა პოემის გადამწყვეტი მომენტი. ფილოსოფოსი ცხოველის ყ. ლაკანისეული აღქმაზე წერს, რომ ლაკანისთვის ცხოველის სახე თავიც მოკატუნებასა და მოტყუებას შორის განსხვავებაში ვლინდება. ცხოველს შეუძლია თავის მოკატუნება, მაგრამ არ შეუძლია მოტყუება, ე.ი. ცხოველი ვერ ამბობს ტყუილს.

თუმცა, პოემის ანიმისტურ მსოფლმხეველობაში ბუნებას უკვე აქვს სუბიექტურობა მინიჭებული, და ყვავილები და თავთავები თვითშენიშვნას ანუ თავისი სიკვდილის გადამწყვეტილებას საკუთარი პასუხისმგებლობით იღებენ. დაწვრილებით, ქრისტიანული თვალსაზრისით, ბუნება თავს სწირავს ადამიანს ნებაყოფილობით, თუმცა, სინამდვილეში საპროტესტო ხმაც ჟღერს პოემაში. საპირისპიროდ, თუკი ანიმისტური თვალსაზრისით განვიხილავთ, მან უნდა დაიცვას საკუთარი თავი, მაგრამ პოემაში თვითშენიშვნა უეჭველადაა განხორციელებული. ამიტომ ვერ გადავწყვეტთ, თუ რომელია სიმართლე. მაშასადამე, ჩვენთვის საინტერესოა ის, რომ ეს ორი სიმართლე ფრჩხილებში ჩავსვავთ და ვალიაროთ, რომ სინამდვილესა და მეტყველებას შორის არსებობს ტყუილი, და ეს ტყუილი შეუძლია ბუნებას.

პოემა „გველის მჭამელი“ შედგება ევროპული ფილოსოფიისგან განსხვავებული ეპისტემოლოგიისგან, რომელსაც ვხედავთ ქართულ მითოლოგიასა და ფოლკლორში. თავისი ქმნილების პირობად პოეტი ანიმისტურ მსოფლმხეველობას იყენებს და პოემას ბიბლიური მსოფლმხეველობის ქრილში წერს; ის წარმოგვიდგენს ედემის სურათს, სადაც ადამიანი და ბუნება ჰარმონიაში ცხოვრობენ. თვითშენიშვნის ეპიზოდი გადამწყვეტი მომენტი, როდესაც ბუნებას ენიჭება სუბიექტურობა. მინდიას თავგადასავალი თავდაპირველ, ცოდვისწინა სამყაროში დაბრუნებასა და ისევ ცოდვაში ჩავარდნას წარმოადგენს.